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ARTICLE
PREPARING THE PARDON POWER
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
P.S. RUCKMAN JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the following pages, I aim to review what the literature of political
science has to say about the topic of reform of state and federal clemency
processes. I then share what I would like to see change with respect to
federal executive clemency. Admittedly, much of my thinking is influenced
by the views of predecessors in my discipline. I then identify what I believe
should be explicit goals and baselines for future assessment of the pardon
power.
As a contextual matter, it is important to note that, at the time this
article was written, Barack Obama was well into the seventh year of his
presidency. At the close of 2015, his sixty-four pardons (which simply re-
stored civil rights) and eighty-nine commutations (which reduced the length
of prison sentences) render his administration one of the least merciful in
history. Most of the very few (eight) presidents who have exercised clem-
ency less than Obama have either served a single term or died before com-
pleting one.1 In addition, President Obama has denied a record 9,007
clemency applications,2 and 2,841 more have been “closed without presi-
dential action.”3
* Professor of Political Science, Rock Valley College, Rockford, IL. Editor, Pardon Power
Blog. Any errors of fact or interpretation herein are my own.
1. P.S. Ruckman Jr., Obama to Blaze Past Franklin Pierce, PARDON POWER BLOG (July 13,
2015), http://www.pardonpower.com/2015/07/obama-to-blaze-past-franklin-pierce.html. The only
presidents who have granted fewer pardons are W.H. Harrison, 1841 (3); James Garfield, 1881
(5); George Washington, 1789–1797 (31); John Adams, 1797–1801 (37); Zachary Taylor,
1849–1950 (43); George H.W. Bush, 1988–1992 (77); Thomas Jefferson, 1801–1809 (129); and
Franklin Pierce 1853–1857 (146). William H. Harrison died on April 4, 1841, only a month after
stepping into the Office of the Presidency. James Garfield was assassinated after serving only four
months. Zachary Taylor died of food poisoning after serving only sixteen months in office.
2. Office of the Pardon Attorney, Clemency Statistics: Barack Obama, DEP’T OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-statistics (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) (noting 1,629 appli-
cations for pardons and 7,378 for commutations of sentence as of the end of 2015).
3. Id. (listing 467 applications for pardons and 2,374 for commutations of sentence).
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Despite the grim nature of these data, on July 13, 2015, White House
Press Secretary Josh Earnest suggested President Obama had taken a “his-
toric step” because of “bold action” in the matter of sentence commuta-
tions.4 Earlier in the day, it had been announced that forty-six had been
granted, and the White House clumsily guessed it was the “largest number”
of commutations “issued by a president on a single day dating back to at
least the Johnson administration.”5 Earnest then attempted to press his point
by arguing that President Obama’s total number of commutations (eighty-
nine) was “more than the number of commutations issued by the four previ-
ous presidents combined.”6
The Press Secretary’s comments seemed not well thought out or far
too reliant upon low levels of knowledge in his audience. While it was true
that President Obama’s eighty-nine commutations were higher than the
combined total for the four previous presidents, it was also true that, to-
gether, those presidents granted eighty-eight. So, President Obama had
“beaten” them by a grand total of one. The point of comparison was all the
more awkward because the four previous presidents received a total of
16,104 sentence commutation applications, whereas President Obama, by
that point, had received 17,156. In other words, he had received over a
thousand more applications than the previous four presidents yet granted
only one more commutation. Furthermore, President Obama had granted
988 fewer pardons than his four predecessors combined, each one of them
topping his mere sixty-four pardons.7
Regardless, it is safe to say that many have been looking to the presi-
dent to do far more with respect to pardons and commutations than just a
little better than recent presidents—most of whom were notoriously neg-
lectful of the pardon power. It is disheartening to think that anyone would
even think to use them as a benchmark for much of anything related to
clemency (except failure).
At present, the good news is that there is palpable expectation that, in
the closing months of his administration, President Obama will grant more
commutations. Some see the potential for a hundred or so. Some see the
possibility of literally thousands.8 For whatever reason, the President’s
4. Press Briefing by Josh Earnest, White House Press Secretary (July 13, 2015), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/13/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-
7132015.
5. Id. In fact, it was the highest number of individual commutations of sentence granted
since July 26, 1935, when Franklin D. Roosevelt granted 151 (many of which were for persons
who violated federal narcotics laws).
6. Id.
7. See Office of the Pardon Attorney, supra note 2.
8. In February 2015, the Washington Post reported that thirty-five thousand federal inmates
had “applied to have their sentences shortened.” Sari Horwitz, U.S. Clemency Effort, Slow to
Start, Will Rely on an Army of Pro Bono Lawyers, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-clemency-effort-slow-to-start-will-rely-on-an-
army-of-pro-bono-lawyers/2015/02/28/2ba8c6bc-bc42-11e4-8668-4e7ba8439ca6_story.html.
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inexplicably parsimonious use of pardons does not seem to be on anyone’s
radar screen of concern.
If the President is—at last—going to show more than casual interest in
clemency, it is hoped that he will do it sooner than later. A steady stream of
commutations (and pardons) from now until the end of the term would be
more ideal, for a variety of reasons. President Clinton’s last-minute antics
did very little positive for the pardon power (see further discussion below),
and the nation does not need or deserve another stunt like his.
The saving grace is that, whether President Obama exercises clemency
a few dozen times, several hundred times, or a thousand times between now
and the end of the term, none of the thoughts and suggestions outlined be-
low would require significant modification. Like several others who have
given the clemency process serious thought over the years, I hold, as a basic
premise, that there are a variety of systematic problems that can only be
addressed by dramatic reorganization of the clemency process and reevalua-
tion of the purposes and goals of the pardon power. These problems were
around long before President Obama came to Washington. Hopefully they
will not hang around much longer.
II. THE LITERATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND REFORM
For many years now, it has been somewhat of a tradition for political
scientists and academics in the legal profession to pass each other like ships
in the night when writing about the pardon power. Even when focusing on
the same events, ideas, and concerns, there has been precious little cross-
pollination. Consequently, there has been little of the benefit derived from
rigorous examination of the topic from a variety of perspectives, each with
their particular strengths and insights. When the University of St. Thomas
invited political scientists to its symposium on “Sentence Commutations
and Executive Pardon Power” in April 2012, and in the pages of its Law
Journal,9 it took a bold, refreshing, progressive step. The 2015 symposium,
“Reviewing Clemency in a Time of Change” and this issue of the Law
Journal represent nothing less.
That being said, this section will focus on what political scientists have
had to say about the topic of reforming clemency processes. In volume nine
of this Review, I reviewed and assessed the literature appearing in the jour-
nals of political science and/or written by those in the discipline.10 Readers
of that piece are certainly cognizant of the fact that this vast literature has
not been blind to concerns for the need for change, adaptation, and some-
times reform.
9. P.S. Ruckman Jr., The Study of Mercy: What Political Scientists Know (and Don’t Know)
About the Pardon Power, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 783 (2012).
10. Id.
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A. Early Critiques and the Progressive Movement
Francis Lieber’s On Civil Liberty and Self-Government featured a “pa-
per on the abuse of the pardoning power” as a second appendix.11 After
enumerating nine “disastrous consequences” of the “arbitrary use” of par-
dons,12 Lieber suggested those consequences had “shown themselves” to
“an alarming degree” in the United States and that “in many parts of the
country,” were “on the increase.”13
But Lieber argued public confidence could be regained if each state
created a “Board of Pardon” with members appointed by the legislature.14
He further recommended that pardons should only be issued by the gover-
nor when recommended by the board,15 and that decisions to grant clem-
ency should be published in advance of the actual grants, as well as the
reasons for each decision.16 Lieber predicted that if such boards were estab-
lished, “a series of fair principles and rules” would, “in a short time,” be
“settled by practice, and the pardon [power] would be far less exposed to
arbitrary action.”17 Fourteen years later, when he wrote about proposed
amendments to the New York Constitution,18 Lieber remained convinced
that there was “[n]o better way of moderating the pardoning power” than by
establishing a pardon board to work “in conjunction with the executive
power.”19
Theodore Roosevelt echoed Lieber’s positions in a 1913 piece written
for the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
(henceforth “The Annals”). Roosevelt described the pardon power as “one
of the most objectionable points” in our criminal justice system20 and
pointed to a New York Times article which reported many governors com-
plained about having little time for clemency decisions. Thus, they “advo-
cated” the creation of pardon boards in their respective states.21 Roosevelt
thought such boards should be composed of governors and appointed “non-
11. FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF GOVERNMENT 390 (Phila., Lippincott,
Grambo & Co., 1853).
12. Id. at 395–96.
13. Id. at 396.
14. Id. at 405.
15. Id. Lieber also suggested that governors be forced to grant clemency if a board recom-
mends such a second time.
16. Id.
17. LIEBER, supra note 11, at 406.
18. FRANCIS LIEBER, Reflections on the Changes Which May Seem Necessary in the Present
Constitution of the State of New York, in 2 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 181, 185 (Daniel Gilman ed., 1881).
19. Id. at 189.
20. Theodore Roosevelt, The New Penology, 46 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 4, 4
(1913).
21. See Governors Discuss the Granting of Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1913, at SM11
(detailing numerous interviews with various governors in regards to the pardoning power).
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political” persons of “high integrity and sound judgment” equipped with
their own “secretary and office staff.”22
In the same year, The Annals featured an article by Herbert S. Hadley,
the Governor of Missouri, who also felt governors needed to “be relieved
from the burden and responsibility of dealing with [pardon applications].”23
He felt this was especially so because governors were “peculiarly subject to
and liable to unwarranted and malicious attacks by sensational and unscru-
pulous newspapers for granting executive clemency,” and because it was
easy “to mislead and to prejudice the public” against “a proper policy of
executive clemency.”24 Hadley guessed, however, that if pardons were ad-
ministered by a board, decisions “would assume something of the form of a
judgment of a court” and “better and more complete investigation[s]”
would be possible.25 Hadley also thought such boards would be largely in-
sulated from “unwarranted attacks and misrepresentations.”26
By 1914, William W. Smithers of the Philadelphia Bar asserted it was
“generally conceded” that “some advisory board should hear [clemency]
applications and make recommendations” to governors for the sake of “reg-
ularity, publicity and careful consideration.”27 In his view, governors were
not using the pardon power enough, even though an executive’s “oath to
‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed’ include[d] the declaration
that he will maintain the constitution which confers upon him the pardoning
power.”28 As far as Smithers was concerned, withholding a pardon in a
“proper case” was no more acceptable than refusing to “call out the militia
when the preservation of public peace demand[ed] it.”29
Smithers suggested, however, that governors were reluctant to pardon
because of the “fallacy of the traditional, vindictive punishment of
criminals” and “futile” nature of attempts to “diminish crime by statutes
fixing a definite penalty for a specified offense.”30 He thus encouraged ex-
ecutives not to “shrink from exercising the pardoning power”31 because
there was a measure of “abuse” in the “failure” to act. Indeed, prisons were
packed with individuals incarcerated “years ago” under “rigid impersonal
and mechanical criminal laws” and “many inmates . . . could and ought to
be free.”32 Thus, Smithers advised executives to do more than simply re-
22. Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 5.
23. Herbert S. Hadley, New Theory as to Punishment of Crime, 46 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.




27. William W. Smithers, The Use of the Pardoning Power, 52 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 61, 63 (1914).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 62–63.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 64.
32. Id. at 65.
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spond more agreeably to clemency applications because they were not
“bound to wait” until pardon applications were filed.33
President Warren Harding, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover,
and Chief Justice William Howard Taft all attended the semi-annual meet-
ing of the Academy of Political Science at the Hotel Astor in May 1921.
There, Frederick A. Cleveland presented a paper on the “reorganization” of
the federal government.34 Cleveland “questioned whether the [federal] ‘par-
dons’ process should be [housed] in the ‘prosecuting’ department” (the De-
partment of Justice).35 In his mind, the prosecution should be “kept out,” or
placed “very far in the background,” when it came to assessing clemency
applications.36 Instead, this “public function” should be “transferred” to
some “group” that had, as a primary purpose, an “outworking of the prob-
lem of social reconstruction.”37 More specifically, Cleveland suggested the
creation of a Bureau of Parole, Probation, and Pardons that would be
housed under the Assistant Secretary for Public Welfare.38 Ten years later,
Clair Wilcox wrote that the pardon power had been “frequently abused by
governors because they “yielded to political pressure.”39 But he also be-
lieved pardons placed an “unfairly heavy burden” on governors who did not
actually “have the time” to “properly” consider applications—which is why
some states had created agencies and boards to advise and assist with the
process.40
B. Humbert’s Assessments of the Pardon Power
Like Frederick Cleveland before him, W.H. Humbert expressed both
general and specific concerns about federal executive clemency. His analy-
sis of the topic was unique, however, because of its exceptional emphasis
on empirical data. The 1941 masterpiece, The Pardoning Power of the
President,41 analyzed data from a record book kept by the U.S. Attorney
33. Smithers, supra note 27, at 65.
34. Frederick A. Cleveland, The Reorganization of the Federal Government: An Alternative
Proposal, PROC. OF THE ACAD. OF POL. SCI. IN THE CITY OF N.Y. 31, 31 (1921).
35. Id. at 40.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Almost a century later, a Washington Post editorial would recommend that “clemency
reviews be moved out of the Justice Department and put in the Department of Health and Human
Services.” It further argued, the “Justice Department’s role should be limited to comments, the
same as other stakeholders. The department that prosecuted a case and advocated for a sentence is
not the appropriate one to conduct a neutral clemency review.” Dennis Couchon, Mr. President,
You’re Doing Clemency Wrong. It’s Not About Law, It’s About Mercy, WASH. POST (July 17,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-is-wrong-granting-clemency-isnt-a-le-
gal-decision/2015/07/17/234612f0-2bf9-11e5-bd33-395c05608059_story.html.
39. Clair Wilcox, The Open Door, 157 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 102, 104
(1931).
40. Id.
41. W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT (1941).
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General or his assistant from 1860 to 188442 and data from the Attorney
General’s Annual Reports from 1884 to 1936.43
Humbert observed commutations were quite common for the better
part of five decades (1860–1941, see Figure 1). Without presenting any data
on the matter, he guessed that the apparent dominance of pardons from
1860 to 1884 may actually have been the result of “a failure to name prop-
erly in every case the form of clemency granted.”44 Pardons that terminated
sentences and restored civil rights were recorded in an identical fashion to
pardons that simply restored civil rights.45
FIGURE 1
Humbert Pardons v. Commutations of Sentence, 1860–1941
This guess seems reasonable given what is now known about clem-
ency practices in even earlier administrations. Zachary Taylor (1849–1850),
for example, signed thirty-eight clemency warrants. But eight of his par-
dons and eight of his remissions also included “discharge” of a prisoner
from custody. The word “commutation” simply was not used in the war-
rants, or in official record keeping.46 Similarly, almost half of 268 clemency
42. Id. at 95. The “record book” actually extended back to 1854, but Humbert found the first
six years of records not to be accurate.
43. Id. The data were gathered by calendar years from 1860–1884, and for fiscal years from
1885–1936. Id. at 95 n.4.
44. Id. at 100.
45. Id. at 100 n.5.
46. National Archives, Clemency Warrants, Dep’t of State, Vols. 5, 6 (1836–1857). Data
gathered by the author in the National Archives in College Park, Md.
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warrants signed by James K. Polk (1845–1849) involved the “discharge” of
prisoners, without any mention whatsoever of “commutations of sen-
tence.”47 It was not until the late 1800s that clemency warrants began to
regularly use the label “commutation” when the length of prison sentences,
or the amount of fines, were reduced (as is the consistent practice today). In
sum, it seems safe to say that commutations of sentence (in the modern
sense of the language) were probably much more common than the left side
of Figure 1 indicates.
Humbert also observed a second trend that began in 1895: “[T]he Pres-
ident disclosed consistently and impressively” an “inclination toward”
granting “pardons to restore civil rights.”48 In the first three decades of the
data, less than 10 percent of the annual grants of clemency involved mere
restoration of rights.49 By 1905, however, the percentage had crossed the 50
percent mark.50 By 1935, 66 percent of the annual grants were pardons to
restore rights.51
When looking at Figure 1, it is also worth remembering that while
Humbert’s data extended to 1936, his book was actually published in 1941.
Thus, it is certain that he was aware of the continuing nosedive in commu-
tations of sentence from 1937–1940 (the far right of the chart). Conse-
quently, Humbert observed that, after the opening of the twentieth century,
presidents “largely departed” from “the most beneficial forms of clemency”
(commutations of sentence) and gravitated to forms which did not “disturb
as drastically the original sentence of the courts” (pardons to restore civil
rights).52
In a separate chart,53 Humbert presented data on the total number of
pardon applications in comparison with the number of grants and denials in
each year. For purposes of consistency, these data have also been extended
to 1941 (see Figure 2). Figure 2 is striking both for the manner in which it
reflects current trends (as will be shown) and the manner in which it reflects
an inclination toward mercy that has long since passed. Across the eight
decades of data, in almost every year represented, presidents granted more
pardons than they denied. This generosity is, of course, dwarfed by the in-
creasing number of clemency applications that were being filed. Year to
year, applications were not being addressed at all, so pending applications
combined with incoming applications to create quite a mess. One would
guess that this backlog—in and of itself—might have attracted some atten-
47. Id.




52. Id. at 102.
53. Id. at 105, chart III.
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FIGURE 2
Clemency Applications v. Grants and Denials: 1860–1941
tion: for example, a call for reform, reorganization, or restructuring from
within (and/or outside of) government. Humbert blandly observed:
If the inability of the President to consider every request for clem-
ency was not apparent in the early days of the government, it
became evident with the increase in clemency cases [from
1910–1936]. . . . As a consequence, acts of clemency increased in
number but the growth did not keep pace with the increase of
requests for executive clemency.54
Humbert’s work perhaps remains the most pertinent and compelling
today for several reasons. First, his writing and analysis exhibited greater
depth than most before and after him. Second, his work is—quite impres-
sively—data-driven. Finally, as will be seen, the problems Humbert identi-
fied in his data remain to this day. They are only more exaggerated. Hence,
his prescriptions for the pardon power remain well worth additional
consideration.
The Pardoning Power of the President concluded with a discussion
regarding potential reforms.55 Echoing Cleveland, twenty years earlier,
Humbert wrote:
54. Humbert, supra note 41, at 106, 109.
55. Id. at 134–42.
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Recommendations on applications for clemency of United States
Judges and Attorneys should not be relied upon to as great an
extent in the future as in the past in deciding what should be done
with applications for clemency. . . . Because of the nature of the
information which a judge receives on a case, because of the dan-
ger of partiality which the experiences of a judge in criminal
cases engender, and because of insufficient time to collect facts
relevant to a decision in clemency cases, the United States
Judge’s recommendations should be critically examined. The
judges imposed the sentence and they are loathe to admit any er-
ror in the original sentence. Secondly, if developments following
the imposition of the sentence show the desirability of a pardon,
the judges may not be in a position to appreciate the subsequent
factors demanding clemency . . . .
This last objection applies with equal force to the practice of rely-
ing upon the recommendations of the United States Attorneys.
The United States Attorneys who frequently reach their offices
because of political preferment, are often fired with a zeal to
make a record by numerous convictions in order to secure further
promotion. Their ardor may bring about a great number of con-
victions, some of which were unwarranted. But will these men be
willing, afterwards, to recommend clemency in the cases in which
over-zealousness brought about a wrongful conviction or too se-
vere a sentence?56
Humbert also presented a second line of recommendations aimed at
“better results” in the use of the pardoning power.57 He saw, for example, a
need for “impartial studies of detailed data on each applicant for clemency,
including the data submitted by the United States Attorneys and Judges
. . . .”
58
 Humbert argued “accurate, impartial, and scientific” information of
this kind would ensure more reasonable decisions by the executive branch
without the assistance of others and “greater uniformity of treatment.”59
Finally, he suggested that a “small board” should be created and equipped
with a staff to conduct these “impartial studies.”60
C. Post-Watergate Analyses
In 1989, David Gray Adler concluded the pardon power had, “on the
whole,” been “judiciously administered, and so the country has been well
served.”61 But pre-conviction pardons (such as that of Richard Nixon) con-
vinced him there was reason enough to “rethink the constitutional structure
56. Id. at 139–40.
57. Id. at 140.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 141.
60. Humbert, supra note 41, at 140.
61. David Gray Adler, The President’s Pardon Power, in INVENTING THE AMERICAN PRESI-
DENCY 209, 230 (Thomas Cronin ed., 1989).
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governing the pardon power.”62 Adler found “merit” in then-Senator Walter
Mondale’s 1974 proposal to allow two-thirds of Congress to “disapprove of
[a] pardon within 180 days of issuance.”63 Over a decade later, Michael
Genovese and Kristine Almquist agreed with Adler’s assessment of
Mondale’s proposal.64
Christopher E. Smith and Scott P. Johnson also agreed that “the appro-
priate scope” of the pardon power deserved “examination and reassess-
ment” in light of the possibility that presidents “could halt criminal
proceedings in order to suppress information about his own misdeeds.”65 In
their view, the “most desirable” protection would be to disallow pardons
before trial.66 A reasonable “alternative approach,” however, would be a
“requirement that the President specify charges when issuing a pardon” so
that “unspecified charges would remain fair targets for prosecution.”67
Finally, in 2003, John Dinan analyzed clemency practices in the states
as a vehicle for discussion of reform of federal executive clemency.68 Dinan
reviewed the records of more than 230 state constitutional conventions and
“examine[d] the distinctive conceptions of the pardon power that had pre-
vailed at the state level.”69 The data revealed most states chose to “deviate”
from the federal model, by the creation of advisory boards, councils, or
some body of persons that shared the power with the governor.70 Many
states required “advance notice that a pardon [was] being considered.”71
Others “demand[ed] that pardons be accompanied by reasons for their issu-
ance,”72 and most states explicitly prohibited pre-conviction pardons.73
As for the question of whether federal practice should be informed by
developments in the states, Dinan guessed presidents might not be as per-
sonally involved in the pardon process as governors, so many of the con-
cerns behind the need for independent decision-making bodies might not
apply.74 In addition, presidents already have the Office of the Pardon Attor-
ney in the Department of Justice to process applications and make recom-
62. Id.
63. S.J. Res. 241, 93rd Cong. (1974); see also Walter Mondale, Harnessing the President’s
Pardon Power, 61 A.B.A. J. 1, 107–08 (Jan. 1975).
64. Michael A. Genovese & Kristine Almquist, The Pardon Power Under Clinton: Tested
but Intact, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE LAW: THE CLINTON LEGACY 75, 86 (David Gray Adler &
Michael A. Genovese eds., 2002).
65. Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson, Presidential Pardons and Accountability in the
Executive Branch, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1989).
66. Id. at 1124.
67. Id. at 1125.
68. John Dinan, The Pardon Power and the American State Constitutional Tradition, 35
POLITY 389 (2003).
69. Id. at 392.
70. Id. at 403.
71. Id. at 411.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Dinan, supra note 68, at 412–13.
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mendations. Yet Dinan also worried “contemporary presidents” have
become “more susceptible . . . to entreaties from pardon applicants and their
friends and families.”75 One possible solution might be an executive order
by each incoming president creating an advisory body.
III. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE
As the previous sections document, political scientists have long held
an interest in executive clemency reform. The general themes most promi-
nent in the literature are clear: clemency is (or should be) an important part
of the business of the state and federal executives. Where it is clear that
clemency systems are broken or dysfunctional, an obvious solution is to
create a separate body to assist with the processing of applications and deci-
sion-making. That body should not usurp the executive’s power but simply
assist in the administration of clemency.
Is the federal clemency process working today? Is it functioning prop-
erly? Figure 3 represents an update of Humbert’s initial concerns regarding
the granting of pardons (to merely restore civil rights) and commutations of
sentence. As can be seen, commutations of sentence have become a kind of
freakish rarity, every now and then disappearing altogether from the land-
scape of the data.76 Figure 3 constitutes cause for celebration if every per-
son that has been tried has been tried fairly, every person that has been
convicted was truly guilty, every plea-bargained sentence has been fair,
every mandatory sentence has perfectly fit the crime, every person impris-
oned has committed the very worst of crimes, every person has not served
an acceptable amount of time, and no one has exhibited any signs whatso-
ever of remorse or rehabilitation. In that case, the American system of crim-
inal justice has been a phenomenal success. However, it is easy enough to
guess that the situation has been otherwise.
In a 2009 letter to Mariano-Florentino Cue´llar, Special Assistant to the
President for Justice and Regulatory Policy, Samuel Morison, a criminal
defense attorney in Washington, D.C., and former staff attorney at the Of-
fice of the Pardon Attorney (for thirteen years) wrote:
With a burgeoning federal prison population of over 200,000 per-
sons and the receipt of about 8,500 commutation requests in eight
years, this advisory record amounts to the assertion that the sys-
tem is essentially perfect – injustices never occur, sentences are
never excessive, circumstances never change, and mercy is never
appropriate. No reasonable person really believes that.77
75. Id. at 413.
76. Apologies to Edward R. Tufte.
77. Letter by Samuel T. Morison to Mariano-Florentino Cue´llar, https://herculesandtheum
pire.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/cuellar-letter-1.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2015).
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FIGURE 3
Pardons v. Commutations of Sentence, 1942–2015
Before moving to Humbert’s second area of concern, it is also worthy
to note that even the overall number of pardons has been in decline for
some time. There may be a variety of explanations for short-term trends
across the chart (see discussion below), but the long-term trend is also wor-
thy of our attention. Many discussions entirely omit, for example, the very
legitimate argument that there has been increasingly less justification or
need for pardoning, especially commutations of sentence. After all, in the
1700s and 1800s, pardons were often used to look into places and corners
where “the law” was blind, making distinctions where judges and juries
were strictly unable to do so (for example, between adult and juvenile of-
fenders, first- and second-degree murder and manslaughter, the sane and the
insane, degrees of culpability based on stress and duress and/or the manipu-
lating influence of others, etc.). Today, our laws are more sophisticated,
refined, and specific to any number of distinctions.
In the early 1900s, the creation of federal alternative release mecha-
nisms, probation and parole, reduced the need for prisoners to go through
all of the hoops to seek commutations of sentence from the president—and
the need for the presidents to grant them. Surely analyses that fail to take
such institutional changes into consideration are deeply flawed.
Finally, the criminal process itself was radically transformed in the
time period covered by the data in Figure 3. Critical decisions by the United
States Supreme Court announced and applied the exclusionary rule, first to
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the states,78 then to federal law enforcement offices.79 The Court also issued
landmark decisions regarding legal representation,80 juvenile defendants,81
plea bargaining,82 and cruel and unusual punishment.83 Consequently, to-
day’s pre-trial criminal processes are more elaborate (and rights-oriented)
than criminal trials were in the 1800s, where a trial, jury deliberation, and
sentencing might all be completed in a single hour!84 The possibility of
human error remains, to be sure, but the elaborate nature of rights-oriented
pre-trial criminal processes has—without doubt—had an impact, limiting
presidential opportunities to make many due-process-type judgments once
commonly made via the pardon power.
FIGURE 4
OPA Workload (Pending & New Applications)
v. Denials and Grants
FY 1945–2015e
Figure 4 charts the total workload of the Office of the Pardon Attorney
(pending applications plus new applications for each fiscal year) against the
78. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
79. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
80. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 33 (1963); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
81. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
82. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
83. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972).
84. Malcolm M. Feely, Plea Bargaining and the Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST.
SYS. J. 338, 345 (1982).
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number of requests that have been granted and the number that have been
denied. In 1941, Humbert expressed concern that clemency applications
were not being processed nearly as quickly as they were coming in. That
situation has only gotten much worse. Across eight decades of Humbert’s
data, presidents just about always granted more pardons than they denied.
Across the seven decades in Figure 4, denials are just about always more
common than grants, so much so that for a considerable part of the last
three decades, grants are barely visible on the chart. Were it not for three
massive waves of denials toward the right side of the chart (2002, 2008, and
2011), the figures for pending cases would have probably been much
higher.
IV. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DECLINE OF CLEMENCY
Why do presidents today deny many more pardons than they grant?
Why are commutations of sentence so freakishly rare? If the bureaucracy
created to facilitate the pardon process is slow, plodding, and just about
always denies the applications that it receives, is it really working as it
should?
A. The 1960s and Nixonian Politics
Many have argued that the “Law and Order” campaigns of Richard
Nixon—in combination with (if not prompted by) public concern about
crime as a major problem facing the nation85—ushered in a kind of hardline
emphasis on retribution in the criminal justice system, which remains domi-
nant to this day, especially in the hearts and minds of state and federal
prosecutors and in the halls of the Department of Justice. In this punitive
environment, to grant pardons is to be “soft on crime” and to set oneself up
for negative electoral consequences. A variety of statistical analyses have
shown some support for this view.86
Anecdotally, Lyndon Johnson was criticized for “opening prison
doors” and “coddling criminals” when he commuted the prison sentence of
an organized crime figure from Cleveland, Ohio, John Alfred Gay. In 1967,
the Cleveland Plain Dealer ran a thirteen-part series on Gay’s case and
discovered the commutation was granted over the objection of the U.S. At-
85. An interesting body of scholarship makes the case that public concern about crime in this
era was not nearly as high as commentators and pundits have asserted. See Dennis D. Loo & Ruth-
Ellen M. Grimes, Polls, Politics and Crime: The ‘Law and Order’ Issues of the 1960s, 5 W.
CRIMINOLOGY REV. 50 (2004); see also Dennis Loo, The Moral Panic That Wasn’t: The Sixties
Crime Issue in the US, in FEAR OF CRIME: CRITICAL VOICES IN AN AGE OF ANXIETY 12 (Murray
Lee, & Steven Farrall eds., 2008).
86. P.S. Ruckman & Bradley M. Jones, Federal Executive Clemency, 1934–2013: A Litera-
ture-Based, Empirical Assessment, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Politi-
cal Science Association, Chicago, IL (Apr. 2014); P.S. Ruckman, President-centered and
Presidency-centered Explanations of Federal Clemency Policy, Paper Presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA (Oct. 1998).
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torney’s Office. The U.S. Pardon Attorney then admitted that none of the
references in Gay’s clemency application were “checked.” Johnson, who
had averaged about seventy commutations of sentence a year to that point,
just about dropped them altogether. The next eighteen months of his admin-
istration featured a mere five commutations,87 and they have not reemerged
as a regular part of presidential business since.
But, again, the general argument is that rhetoric and concerns about
crime ushered in a new age of hyper-emphasis on retributive justice. Other
classic goals in sentencing (rehabilitation, reform, restoration, etc.) simply
fell to the wayside.
B. Ford’s Pardon of Nixon
With no small amount of irony, on September 8, 1974, Gerald Ford
found himself granting a full and unconditional pardon to Richard Nixon.
Gallup found 53 percent of Americans disagreed with the pardon, and only
38 percent supported it.88 Ford, who began the term with approval ratings
above 70 percent, saw his numbers drop twenty points by the end of the
month.89 By the end of the year, his approval rating fell to 42 percent and
he averaged only 44 percent for the remainder of the term.90 Research has
since verified what pundits and almost every casual observer assumed at the
time: Ford’s pardon of Nixon went a long way toward Jimmy Carter win-
ning the presidency.91 The concern over the potential connection between
pardons and electoral politics was strengthened.
C. Structural Changes in the Carter Administration
Some have attributed the recent decline in pardoning to a factor far
less prone to dramatization: institutional change in the Department of Jus-
tice. Jimmy Carter’s attorney general, Griffin Bell, informally passed his
“clemency tasks and overseeing responsibilities” to the deputy attorney
general.92 Attorneys general have since followed suit. Consequently, the
task of advising the president on pardons was assumed by “lower-ranking”
officials who were, in a sense, more distant from the president and “more
87. P.S. Ruckman Jr., How the Media Killed the Commutation, PARDON POWER BLOG (Mar.
29, 2010), http://www.pardonpower.com/2010/03/how-media-killed-commutation.html.
88. Frank Newport & Joseph Carroll, Americans Generally Negative on Recent Presidential
Pardons, Gallup.com (Mar. 9, 2007), http://www.gallup.com/poll/26830/americans-generally-
negative-recent-presidential-pardons.aspx. Interestingly, by 1986, Gallup found 54 percent of
Americans saying the pardon was the right thing to do.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS (1981); Eric
M. Uslaner & M. Margaret Conway, The Responsible Congressional Electorate: Watergate, the
Economy, and Vote Choice in 1974, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 788 (1985).
92. JEFFREY CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER 93 (Univ. of Kansas Press, 2009).
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concerned with punishment than mercy” (or the retributive justice model
discussed above).93
D. The “Willie Horton” Effect
In a Democratic primary debate during the 1988 presidential election,
Senator Al Gore took issue with a Massachusetts furlough program in an
attempt to score political points off of an opponent, Governor Michael
Dukakis. The Los Angeles Times reported:
Gore went after Dukakis again when, given the opportunity to
question him directly, he brought up a prison reform program that
Dukakis had sponsored in Massachusetts, which granted weekend
passes to prisoners, including some serving life sentences for
murder. As Gore noted, 11 of these convicts failed to return, and
two committed murders. . . . “If you were elected President,
would you advocate a similar program for federal penitentiaries?”
Gore asked to hoots and laughter from the audience.94
When Governor Dukakis eventually became the Democratic Party’s
nominee, George H.W. Bush began referring to the same program in public
speeches and to one beneficiary in particular.95 Willie Horton committed a
particularly brutal murder in 1974 and, over a decade later, was released on
the weekend furlough program in question while serving a life sentence
without the possibility of parole.96 After ten such releases, however, Horton
did not return to prison. As a fugitive, he raped a woman twice, violently
assaulted a friend of the victim, and stole an automobile.97
In September 1988, a Republican-leaning political action committee
ran a thirty-second ad comparing the views of Bush and Dukakis on the
death penalty and referred to the weekend furlough program.98 It noted
first-degree murderers had been granted such “weekend passes” and
93. Id. at 93–94. It should be noted that a large portion of this section in Prof. Crouch’s work
violates the non-cross-pollination tradition discussed above, referencing the work of Margaret
Colgate Love, a former U.S. pardon attorney. See Margaret Colgate Love, Fear of Forgiving: Rule
and Discretion in the Theory and Practice of Pardoning, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 125, 126 (2001)
(discussing the tension present in the pardon power that emerges from the duty to balance law
enforcement with mercy).
94. Robert Shogan, Gore, Dukakis Tangle During N.Y. Debate, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 13, 1988),
http://articles.latimes.com/1988-04-13/news/mn-1028_1_dukakis-administration; see also Sidney
Blumenthal, Gore Opened the Issue of Dukakis on Crime, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 30,
1988, at 14A.
95. Kenneth J. Cooper, Furlough Plan Haunts Dukakis Bush Invokes Name of Killer on
Loose, MIAMI HERALD, June 26, 1988, at 17A.
96. Kevin Merida, Dukakis Challenged on Crime, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 3, 1988, at
12A.
97. Id.
98. Beth Schwartzapfel & Bill Keller, Willie Horton Revisited, THE MARSHALL PROJECT
(May 13, 2015, 6:37 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/13/willie-horton-revisited
#.zsgHee3Mg.
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showed a mug shot of Horton.99 The following month, the Bush campaign
produced its own ad, which did not mention Horton by name but once again
referred to the “Dukakis furlough program.”100 Critics attempted to blunt
any potential effectiveness of the ads by claiming their content was unac-
ceptably “racial,” if not outright racist.101
While additional details could certainly be recounted here, the pardon
power had nothing whatsoever to do with the core facts. Dukakis did not
pardon Horton. No one else pardoned Horton. No one has ever pardoned
Horton. He remains in prison.102
A conventional wisdom developed, however, among many journalists,
commentators, and scholars, which suggests governors have since shied
away from the exercise of the pardon power (especially commutations of
sentence) for fear that some recipient might turn out to be “the next Willie
Horton.” The “Willie Horton effect” has been utilized to explain the decline
in presidential pardoning as well. Governors and presidents can hardly ex-
pect any electoral advantage as a result of pardoning, but the potential for
negative consequences (if not outright disaster) when the “next Willie Hor-
ton” shows up is enormous. As the explanation goes, the conclusion of the
calculus is straightforward enough: it is just better and smarter to err on the
side of caution by doing as little as possible or nothing at all.103
99. Id.
100. 1988 Bush v. Dukakis, MUSEUM OF THE MOVING IMAGE: THE LIVING CANDIDATE, PRESI-
DENTIAL CAMPAIGN COMMERCIALS, 1952–2012, http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commer-
cials/1988/revolving-door (last visited Jan. 17, 2016).
101. Robert S. Boyd, Jackson Accuses Bush Campaign of Stirring Up Racist Fears, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 24, 1988, at 7A; Philip J. Trounstine, Dukakis Agrees Bush’s TV Ads Tinged with
Bias, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 25, 1988, at 1A.
102. Schwartzapfel & Keller, supra note 98.
103. Wisconsin’s Scott Walker is perhaps the best example of a governor (and presidential
hopeful) who has driven this strategy over the cliff wildly. After his inauguration on January 3,
2011, Walker created a Pardon Advisory Board by executive order, then refused to appoint any-
one to it. By November, he had granted no pardons and a spokesperson clumsily said he had no
“plans” to grant pardons because he believed those “decisions” should “be left up to the
courts.” Walker announced his policy more explicitly in May 2012, saying, “I’m not issuing par-
dons on anything. Period.” Six months later, form letters informed applicants the governor had
“suspended” the pardon process “indefinitely.” No further explanation was provided. In January
2013, Walker told reporters that he had actually not suspended the state’s pardon process, but he
just wasn’t issuing any. He added that pardons “undermine the criminal justice system.” Two
months later, over 1,400 applications had been filed, but Walker explained that pardons were not
“really” what he “campaigned on” or “talked about.” Since the only people seeking pardons were
“guilty of a crime” he would not be “undermining the actions” of juries and courts. In December
2014, the Walker administration proposed eliminating the Pardon Advisory Board altogether. See
The Associated Press, Walker Has No Plans for Granting Pardons, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTI-
NEL (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/walker-has-no-plans-for-grant-
ing-pardons-j837jvk-134584228.html; Mike Johnson, Jason Stein & Patrick Marley, Turnout for
Recall Election Expected to Exceed 2010 Race, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May 29, 2012), http://
www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/walker-says-he-wont-pardon-former-aides-hits-barrett-on-
crime-ib5jbv2-155403115.html; P.S. Ruckman Jr., Wisconsin: Walker Suspends Justice “Indefi-
nitely”, PARDON POWER BLOG (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.pardonpower.com/2012/11/wiscon-
sin-walker-suspends-justice.html; Greg Neumann, Gov. Walker Says Pardons Undermine
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\12-3\UST303.txt unknown Seq: 19 20-APR-16 8:37
464 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:3
E. Clinton’s Clemency Caper
President Clinton’s last-minute pardons generated a level of public
controversy that brought comparisons with the aftermath of Gerald Ford’s
pardon of Richard Nixon.104 CNN reported the “vast majority” of the indi-
viduals pardoned were “unknown to the public.”105 But the list did include
former Housing and Urban Development Secretary Henry Cisneros, John
Fife Symington (former Governor of Arizona), Patricia Hearst, Whitewater
figure Susan McDougal, former CIA Director John Deutch, and Democratic
Congressman Mel Reynolds. The list of clemency recipients also included
the president’s brother, Roger Clinton, and one of the FBI’s top-ten “most
wanted” fugitives from justice, Marc Rich.
USA Today noted the applications for several of Clinton’s “last-min-
ute” pardons were supported by a “Who’s Who of America’s rich, famous
and influential” including rock star Don Henley, historian Arthur
Schelsinger Jr., veteran newscaster Walter Cronkite, Lady Bird Johnson, the
Reverend Jesse Jackson, and former Presidents Carter and Ford.106 Demo-
cratic Congressmen Earl Hilliard (AL), Charles Rangel (NY), Dale E.
Kildee (MI), Patrick Kennedy (RI), Xavier Becerra (CA), Danny Davis
(IL), and Maxine Waters (CA) supported clemency applications, as did
Republicans Orrin Hatch (UT), Jim Ramstad (MN), and Fred Thompson
(TN).107 MSNBC also focused on the efforts of Henley and noted the co-
founder of “The Eagles” donated $180,000 in soft money to Democratic
political committees in 1996, $2,000 to Hillary Clinton’s Senate campaign
and $2,000 to Al Gore.108 The New York Times linked clemency decisions
to the influence of television producer Harry Thomason, Democratic Fun-
draiser Terry McAuliffe, Hugh Rodham (the First Lady’s brother), Jack
Quinn (former White House Counsel), the president and editor of the Las
Criminal Justice System, WKOW (Jan. 3, 2013, 12:27 PM), http://www.wkow.com/story/204958
23/2013/01/03/gov.
104. On January 20, with only a few hours left in his presidency, Clinton granted 140 pardons
and 36 commutations of sentence. Office of the Pardon Attorney, Pardons Granted by President
William J. Clinton (1993–2001), DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/pardon/clintonpardon_
grants.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2016); Office of the Pardon Attorney, Commutations, Remissions,
and Reprieves Granted by President William J. Clinton (1993–2001), DEP’T OF JUST., http://www
.justice.gov/pardon/clinton_comm.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2016).
105. Associated Press & Reuters, In One of His Last Acts as President, Clinton Grants 140
Pardons, CNN (Jan. 20. 2001, 12:38 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20011206120827/http://
www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/stories/01/20/clinton.pardon/.
106. Associated Press, Celebrities Asked Clinton to Grant Pardons, USA TODAY (Mar. 8,
2001, 6:03 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/2001-03-08-famouspardons.htm.
107. Congressmen, Senators Weighed in on Pardons, USA TODAY (Mar. 9, 2001, 1:54 AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/2001-03-08-pardonlist.htm.
108. Jim Popkin, Don Henley Lobbied Clinton for Commutation for Bookie, MSNBC (Mar. 6,
2001, 9:05 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20010818094152/http://www.freerepublic.com/fo-
rum/a3aa66a586ccb.htm.
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Vegas Sun, and a former roommate and classmate of former President Clin-
ton while attending Oxford University and Yale Law School.109
The investigative functions of the House Government Reform Com-
mittee and the Senate Judiciary Committee powered up110 and, in the minds
of some, pardoning, for still yet another reason, became a high-wire maneu-
ver without a net. Indeed, Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, waited
longer than any other president in history (699 days) before granting the
first pardon of his administration.111 Eight years later, when he left office,
Bush granted less than half as many pardons and commutations as
Clinton.112
Readers may find any (or all) of the above explanations lurking when
writers and commentators focus on why we are where we are with respect
to the pardon power. They are all plausible and informative, but disentan-
gling their individual effects in any rigorous manner would be a difficult
task. Moreover, many times, it is difficult enough to simply understand and
explain what happens (or does not happen) within a single administration.
V. PRESIDENT OBAMA’S DISAPPOINTING RECORD
Consider President Obama and his promise of “Hope and Change.”113
During the campaign, he specifically addressed highly relevant hot-button
criminal justice issues, like mandatory minimum sentences,114 the disparate
impact of laws on African Americans,115 and his belief that America is a
place where people should be given second chances.116 The very clear ex-
pectation of many was that he would use the pardon power like no other
109. Don Van Natta Jr. & Marc Lacey, Access Proved Vital in Last-Minute Race for Clinton
Pardons, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/25/us/access-proved-vi-
tal-in-last-minute-race-for-clinton-pardons.html?pagewanted=all.
110. See JUSTICE UNDONE: CLEMENCY DECISIONS IN THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE, H.R. REP.
NO. 107-454, vol. 1 (Mar. 14, 2002).
111. P.S. Ruckman Jr., The Significance of the Lardner Warrant, PARDON POWER BLOG (Nov.
24, 2010), http://www.pardonpower.com/2010/11/significance-of-lardner-warrant.html#more.
112. See Office of the Pardon Attorney, supra note 2.
113. Katie Zezima, Obama’s New Approach: Keep ‘Hope and Change’ Alive, WASH. POST
(July 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obamas-new-approach-keep-hope-and-
change-alive/2014/07/25/72bc7522-0eae-11e4-8341-b8072b1e7348_story.html.
114. Obama @ Howard: Attack is the New Black, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 28, 2007), https://
newrepublic.com/article/33356/obama-howard-attack-the-new-black.
115. In a speech delivered on January 20, 2008, Obama mentioned “Jena justice,” a reference
to six black teenagers convicted in the beating/hospitalization of a white high school student
in Jena, Louisiana. Five were sentenced to seven days’ unsupervised probation. The sixth defen-
dant was given an 18-month prison sentence. Barack Obama, Remarks in Atlanta: “The Great
Need of the Hour”, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 20, 2008), http://www.presi-
dency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77027; see also Miami Hall, Convict Petitions Obama to Re-
duce Crack Penalty, USA TODAY (Apr. 27, 2010, 2:00 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/washington/2010-04-27-clemency_N.htm.
116. P.S. Ruckman Jr., Obama on Second Chances, PARDON POWER BLOG (Jan. 24, 2010),
http://www.pardonpower.com/2010/01/obama-on-second-chances.html; see also Yunji De Nies &
Z. Byron Wolf, President Obama Touches Nerve, Praising Michael Vick’s Second Chance, ABC
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president in recent history. Instead, at present, the only “change” that is
evident is that he has used the power even less than George W. Bush. What
explains this?
One might consider the President’s decision to appoint Eric Holder as
attorney general. Mr. Holder brought quite a bit of baggage with him re-
garding pardons, as he was Bill Clinton’s deputy attorney general,117 and it
is easy to imagine he had little enthusiasm for such. Later, it became obvi-
ous that President Obama was going to retain George W. Bush’s pardon
attorney, Ronald Rodgers. That certainly did not strike anyone as an im-
pressive display of interest in change, at least not with respect to pardons.118
As record numbers of applications came in, and few grants were com-
ing out, some wondered if the staff in the Office of the Pardon Attorney was
up to the task. In 2009, a former U.S. pardon attorney openly offered that it
was “hard to see how the small staff of the OPA (5 lawyers for most of
Bush’s tenure) could have given many of the cases denied [the] full review
they deserved.”119 In the same year, a former staff attorney in that Office
wrote:
The disintegration of the clemency advisory system is not simply
a matter of applying an unduly strict standard of review but,
rather, the abandonment of the review process altogether in many
cases. Since June 2008, the current Pardon Attorney has transmit-
ted more than 2,200 clemency cases to the Deputy Attorney Gen-
NEWS (Dec. 27, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-obama-praises-chances-michael-
vick-eagles-owner/story?id=12487824.
117. P.S. Ruckman Jr., Holder Disqualified, PARDON POWER BLOG (Nov. 26, 2008), http://
www.pardonpower.com/2008/11/holder-disqualified.html#more.
118. Eventually, Obama selected his own Pardon Attorney, Debra Leff, but not without con-
siderable drama. In December 2012, Rodgers was the subject of a 21-page OIG Report which said
the following in the matter of the clemency application of a 23-year old, first time offender who
received three life sentences in a drug conspiracy case:
Rodgers did not represent [U.S. Attorney] Rhodes’s views accurately to the White
House in his e-mail on December 3, 2008. We believe that Rodgers’ characterization of
Rhodes’s position was colored by his concern . . . that the White House might grant
Aaron ‘clemency presently’ and his desire that this not happen. . . . [It] was not an
accurate characterization of what Rhodes wrote. . . . Rodgers should not have character-
ized it as he did. He should have acknowledged the ambiguity in his email and relied on
his own arguments, instead of indicating inaccurately that Rhodes agreed with him that
the petition was ‘about 10 years premature’ and should be denied. . . . We also believe
that Rodgers’s choice of words in the emails to describe Judge Butler’s position ran the
risk of misleading the White House about the sentencing judge’s position. . . . In sum,
we concluded that Pardon Attorney Rodgers did not accurately represent the views of
U.S. Attorney Deborah Rhodes . . . and his conduct fell substantially short of the high
standards to be expected of Department of Justice employees and of the duty that he
owed to the President of the United States.
OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.: OVERSIGHT AND REV. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., A REV. OF THE
PARDON ATT’Y’S RECONSIDERATION OF CLARENCE AARON’S PETITION FOR CLEMENCY 15–17, 21
(Dec. 2012).
119. Margaret Colgate Love, Final Report Card on Pardoning by George W. Bush (July 27,
2009, rev. Mar. 13, 2009), http://pardonlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/pardonlawimport/FinalRe-
portCard.3.13.09.pdf.
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eral’s Office without conducting a meaningful review of a single
one of these petitions. Instead, he has support staff prepare lists of
names with basic sentencing information and attaches them to a
cover memorandum, which asserts in boilerplate language that “a
review of the contents of each petition establishes that none has
merit.” On this basis, he asserts that “there is no reason to conduct
a further investigation by this office . . . .”
While this reporting format has been used in the past in limited
circumstances, it has never been thought appropriate to indiscrim-
inately clear out a backlog of pending cases in this fashion. Given
the sheer volume of cases involved, it is not physically possible
that each petition was reviewed by OPA’s small professional
staff. In fact, none of these cases was even assigned to an attor-
ney. Accordingly, there is little basis for asserting that each one is
necessarily without merit. Moreover, even on the assumption that
all of these cases would have ended up being denied anyway, in
my view, this sort of superficial treatment invariably undermines
the integrity of the advisory process . . . .120
These concerns, of course, became even more relevant when President
Obama received record numbers of clemency applications, especially for
commutation of sentence.121
Along the way, the notion was also floated (perhaps in desperation)
that the President was just too busy with other things that were much more
important: health care, war, national security, etc. This explanation was no-
tably unconvincing for a number of reasons. In the 2008 campaign, when
Senator John McCain proposed postponing a presidential debate in order to
meet with congressional leaders to address the nation’s financial crisis,
Obama offered a terse rebuke:
Presidents are going to have to deal with more than one thing at a
time. . . . It’s not necessary for us to think that we can do only one
thing, and suspend everything else.122
Although Obama may have been right, the days of presidents plowing
through pardon applications are long gone. There is a considerable (and not
inexpensive) bureaucracy that is supposed to do that. It is the job of that
bureaucracy to forward recommendations to the president. If that bureau-
cracy is functioning properly, a steady flow of recommendations (and, yes,
grants) should be expected, regardless of what the presidential calendar
looks like.123 And, in fact, for most of our nation’s history, that was exactly
120. Morison, supra note 77.
121. See Office of the Pardon Attorney, supra note 2.
122. Presidential Debate Still Pending, CBS NEWS (Sept. 25, 2008, 6:15 AM), http://www
.cbsnews.com/news/presidential-debate-still-pending/.
123. In a March 2013 column, Debra Saunders observed sequestration cuts might force the
Department of Justice “to cut $338 million from the prison budget, which could lead to the fur-
lough of 37,000 prison employees for two weeks and lockdowns to reduce violence.” Saunders
called this “nonsense,” arguing, “[t]he Department of Justice has staff members whose job is to
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the case. Pardons and commutations were granted at a steady pace, regard-
less of the wildest variety of circumstances in which presidents have found
themselves, because the bureaucracy functioned properly doing what it was
supposed to do.124
Abraham Lincoln granted pardons not only in the aftermath of the dis-
astrous showing of Federal troops in the Battle of the First Bull Run while
his eleven-year-old son, Willie, was suffering from typhoid fever.125 He
also granted pardons during the week of the Battle of Gettysburg.126 Grover
Cleveland granted thirty-two pardons during the Pullman Strike.127 Wood-
row Wilson granted pardons on the day the United States declared war on
Germany and in the following week.128 He also granted thirty plus pardons
while the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered entrance into the
League of Nations (Wilson’s own creation) and over 300 while the League
languished in the Senate. Wilson even granted nineteen pardons in October
of 1919, just after suffering a massive debilitating stroke.129
Herbert Hoover granted six pardons the week following the great stock
market crash of 1929.130 Franklin Roosevelt granted eleven pardons in the
week following the attack on Pearl Harbor and thirty-eight pardons in the
three days following the Normandy Invasion.131 Harry Truman granted
nineteen pardons in August 1945, when the atomic bombs were dropped on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.132 In June 1950, as the Korean War escalated to
the point of Chinese involvement, Truman found time to grant twenty-four
pardons.133 Truman also granted forty-seven pardons from April 8 to June
2, 1952, which was the period of time he had seized the steel mills of
Youngstown, Ohio, in order to avoid a general strike.134
review clemency applications. It is their job to vet petitions and recommend commutations for
worthy inmates. If they do their job right and save their recommendations for inmates with no
violent history and good prison records, there is little political downside. But if the President
doesn’t want to take any risk in the exercise of mercy, he should be honest and furlough the
pardon staff permanently. Then, at least, the President could spare federal prosecutors and
counterterrorism operatives from furloughs.” Debra J. Saunders, Obama the Merciless, SFGATE
(Mar. 4, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/saunders/article/Obama-the-merciless-
4327652.php.
124. In contrast, presidents since Eisenhower have gone twenty, thirty, even forty months in a
row without granting a single pardon or commutation of sentence. P.S. Ruckman Jr., Obama:
More Dubious Pardon-Making History, PARDON POWER BLOG (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www
.pardonpower.com/2013/01/obama-more-dubious-pardon-history-making.html.
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Today, however, presidents will go many months without granting a
single pardon or commutation of sentence. The time has come for change.
Federal executive clemency is in dire need of reform. No one who is famil-
iar with the current process defends it with any degree of enthusiasm, much
less argues that it is effective, beneficial, and fair.
VI. STEPS TO REFORM
When all is said and done, the pardoning power is ultimately a presi-
dential power. If the president is not concerned about, or at least mindful of,
the critical necessity of mercy, then it really does not matter how much
reorganizing and shuffling results from any reform-minded effort. On the
other hand, the reforms suggested below might very well increase presiden-
tial interest in the prerogative of mercy because the changes suggested
would have the net effect of regularizing the clemency process and encour-
aging more systematic consideration of applications. These changes would
go a long way toward educating the public and restoring confidence in the
pardon power. The existence of a more informed public would in turn dull
the impact of hyperbolic and/or unfair criticism of pardons—long held to be
a primary factor in executive hesitance to show mercy.
A. Relocate the Administration of Clemency
Frederick A. Cleveland was correct, in 1921, to suggest that the bu-
reaucratic apparatus associated with the processing of clemency applica-
tions and forwarding recommendations to the president should be moved,
by executive order, out of the Department of Justice. The creation of the
Office of the Pardon Attorney was an outstanding idea for its time.135 Presi-
dents are busy, applications are many, and the specifics of requests are
likely to be complex. It made perfect sense, as we transitioned to the mod-
ern presidency, to delegate authority to professional bureaucrats who could
assist the president with recommendations136 resulting from painstaking,
deliberative processes guided by articulated goals, routinized behavior, the
development of systemized norms, and—most of all—fairness.
135. Former U.S. Pardon Attorney John R. Stanish summarizes the bureaucratic history as
follows:
Prior to 1850 the preliminary and advisory duties in pardon cases were performed by the
Attorney General and the Secretary of State, jointly. About 1850 all the preliminary and
advisory work was transferred to the Attorney General. However, warrants of pardon
continued to be issued through the Department of State until 1893 when President
Cleveland by Executive Order transferred that responsibility also to the Attorney Gen-
eral. The Act of March 3, 1865 created the Office of Pardon Clerk in the Office of the
Attorney General. By the Act of March 3, 1891 an Attorney in charge of pardons was
substituted for the Pardon Clerk. Thus the Office of the Pardon Attorney originated prior
to the creation of the Department of Justice in 1870.
See John R. Stanish, The Effects of a Presidential Pardon, 42 FED. PROBATION 3 (1978).
136. Rather than shut down and/or grossly retard the clemency process.
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But both Cleveland, in the 1920s, and Humbert, in the 1940s, saw the
handwriting on the wall. Nesting the pardon power in the bureaucracy of
the Department of Justice provided too much of an opportunity for the in-
fluence of judges and federal prosecutors—while certainly noteworthy, and
important—to have lopsided impact on the bureaucratic development of the
clemency process and, eventually, the application of the pardon power it-
self. Toss in a cubic ton or two of inflexible, heavy-handed punitive deci-
sion-making and the retributive justice model. Then, sprinkle in modern
telecommunications, the contemporary news cycle, and the ability for a
story to be reported, manipulated, and styled in any number of ways to
shock readers, spark debate, and set decision-makers back on their heels.
Before you know it, the pardon power is no longer a relevant, plausible, and
serious executive check on either the legislative or judicial branches. It
seems clear enough that this is exactly the situation we are in. The pardon
process needs to be moved closer to the president, perhaps in the Executive
Office of the President.137
Samuel Morison, again, a former staff attorney at the Office of the
Pardon Attorney (for thirteen years) has written:
Whatever utility [the] arrangement once had, the structural defi-
ciencies in the existing [pardon] advisory system have rendered it
dysfunctional. Under the circumstances, I submit that the Presi-
dent has a constitutional obligation to remove the advisory role
from the Justice Department, and reconstitute it within the Execu-
tive Office of the President, where it can operate without the bur-
den of an entrenched conflict of interest.138
B. Adjust the U.S. Pardon Attorney’s Tenure
The tenure of U.S. pardon attorneys should be changed to coincide
with the arrival and departure of each president. The pardon attorney should
not be a nameless, faceless bureaucrat held over from years past and per-
haps even appointed by a president of a different political party. The posi-
tion should reflect, as nearly as possible, the views and opinions of the
president it is supposed to assist in clemency decision-making. If presidents
want to outsource the actual selection process (as they do with lower federal
court positions), so be it. Even the pretense of interest—by forcing the ne-
137. “To provide the President with the support that he or she needs to govern effectively, the
Executive Office of the President (EOP) was created in 1939 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
The EOP has responsibility for tasks ranging from communicating the President’s message to the
American people to promoting our trade interests abroad. Overseen by the White House Chief of
Staff, the EOP has traditionally been home to many of the President’s closest advisors.” Executive
Office of the President, The Administration, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ad-
ministration/eop (last visited Jan. 17, 2016).
138. Samuel Morison, Saving Grace: Salvaging the Pardon Advisory System, AM. CONSTITU-
TION SOC’Y BLOG (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/saving-grace-salvaging-the-
pardon-advisory-system.
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cessity of a timely appointment—would be an improvement over the cur-
rent circumstance.
C. Create a Clemency Board / Commission
As the discussion of the literature of political science documents,
Lieber, Roosevelt, Hadley, Smithers, Cleveland, and Wilcox all saw the
wisdom in the creation of a special board or commission to assist execu-
tives with clemency processes. While it is true that most of them were fo-
cusing on governors in the states, the logic of their arguments seems quite
applicable to the presidents of today. The states, of course, have often oper-
ated as laboratories of democracy,139 where ideas and policies have been
tested. The literature on “policy diffusion” in political science and public
administration has established that governments can—and do—learn from
each other.140
As of December 2015, six states administer the pardon power by inde-
pendent boards141 and an additional twenty states have created advisory
boards.142 It is noteworthy that in eleven of the fifteen states where pardon-
ing occurs most frequently today, the power is administered by such boards.
On the other hand, a recent analysis notes that in the twenty-four states
where the pardon power is almost completely centralized into the hands of
the governor, the output in twenty of those states can be best described with
words like “infrequent,” “sparing,” and “rare.”143
From today’s standpoint, Gerald Ford’s Presidential Clemency Board
(created to handle thousands of cases of draft evasion) appears to be both a
logical step in the development and evolution of thinking about the pardon
power and an idea ahead of its time.144 Today, it is apparent that it would be
useful to create a permanent board or commission—again, outside of the
Department of Justice—to assist the president with decision making on
139. Justice Louis Brandeis famously wrote: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
140. Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, Policy Diffusion: Seven Lessons for Scholars and
Practitioners, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 788, 790 (2012).
141. Margaret Colgate Love, Chart # 3 – Characteristics of Pardon Authorities, NACDL
RESTORATION OF RIGHTS PROJECT (Dec. 2015), https://www.nacdl.org/uploadedFiles/files/re
source_center/2012_restoration_project/Characteristics_of_Pardon_Authorities.pdf (the five states
are AL, CT, GA, ID, SC, and UT).
142. Id. (the twenty states are AK, AZ, AR, DE, FL, KS, LA, MA, MI, MN, MO, MT, NE,
NV, NH, OH, OK, PA, RI, TX).
143. Id.
144. Mark Osler & Matthew Fass, The Ford Approach and Real Fairness for Crack Convicts,
23 FED. SENT’G REP. 228, 229 (2011); Mark Osler & P.S. Ruckman Jr., Obama Would Do Well to
Follow General Ford’s Example of Clemency, WACO TRIB. (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.wacotrib
.com/opinion/columns/board_of_contributors/mark-osler-p-s-ruckman-jr-guest-columnists-
obama-would/article_42ad0969-f285-54a8-84e4-cc92b403ca6a.html.
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clemency applications.145 Such a board should not limit, or be able to limit,
the president’s power in any way shape or form. It should only assist the
president. “Assistance,” however, should mean more than mere existence.
The creation of such an institution should be accompanied by a clear set of
baseline expectations.
While the number of persons serving on the board might be a point of
contention, a more important issue would be its composition or makeup. It
would be horribly wrong to stack it with (or require members to have expe-
rience as) prosecutors and judges (who are often former prosecutors). A
more intelligent route would be to allow such persons to serve (especially
prosecutors and judges who have recommended clemency on behalf of ap-
plicants in the past) and include the pardon attorney, as well as one advisor
assistant from the Office of the Pardon Attorney.146 When filling positions,
however, primary emphasis should be placed on finding persons with expe-
rience on the defense side of the criminal justice equation, probation and
parole officers, sentencing experts, prison officials, scholars who have
researched and written about clemency, attorneys who have successfully
represented clemency applicants, and persons who can demonstrate at least
some minimal interest in matters related to criminal justice, especially the
post-conviction universe.
D. Produce, Track, and Publish Relevant Data
Remarkably, a former U.S. Pardon Attorney has described the Justice
Department’s clemency program as “hard to understand and even harder to
penetrate, operating in secret and accountable to no one.”147 The clemency
board proposed here would present an annual report (separate from the An-
nual Report of the attorney general—see comments below) that sheds con-
siderable light on what it has done and how it has done it. The report should
provide elaborate, useful data that allow for intelligent assessment of the
efficiency of the processing of applications. This kind of information should
not be the by-product of a special, expensive study funded by federal grant
money.148 It should be the daily work product of the clemency board.
145. See Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, The President’s Idle Executive Power: Pardoning,
WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-presidents-idle-ex-
ecutive-power-pardoning/2014/11/26/3934ab1c-71aa-11e4-8808-afaa1e3a33ef_story.html.
146. The later might rotate on an annual, or biannual basis, between other attorney advisors in
that Office.
147. Margaret Colgate Love, Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Process: What the President
Can Learn from the States, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 22 (Jan. 2013), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/de-
fault/files/Love_-_Reinvigorating_the_Federal_Pardon_Process_0.pdf.
148. One such effort observed that, while the Office of the Pardon Attorney utilized “few
written policies and procedures for processing clemency applications,” on average, it took almost
two years to process an application resulting in positive grants. The figure for pardons was 3.27
years and 1.57 years for commutations of sentence. But “a significant cause” of delay in process-
ing applications was due to the fact that “the entities receiving referrals [from the OPA] did not
always respond [within] the period of time required by the entities’ internal guidelines or the
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\12-3\UST303.txt unknown Seq: 28 20-APR-16 8:37
2016] PREPARING THE PARDON POWER 473
For example, the number of recommendations forwarded to the presi-
dent should be tabulated by month. The amount of time that it takes the
board to make such recommendations should be meticulously monitored as
well. A series of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests once uncov-
ered the adventures of an application filed in September 1998. A pardon
was granted fourteen years later, in March 2013, after the application went
through the Office of the Pardon Attorney four times, the Office of the
Deputy Attorney General five times, and the White House three times.149 It
is safe to assume this was an extraordinary, exceptional circumstance. But
that is exactly the point. No one should have to assume anything. There
should be a clear, specific, regular public accounting.150 Finally, the board
should not be able to simply report that hundreds (or thousands) of applica-
tions are “closed without presidential action” without further elaboration.151
Tables in an annual report should provide more specific information on the
broadest categories encompassed by that language.152
period of time requested by the OPA.” These “entities” would include: the ATF, Bureau of Pris-
ons (BOP) Headquarters and Wardens, the DEA, the FBI, United States Attorney’s Offices, Anti-
trust Division, Civil Division, Civil Rights Division, Criminal Division, and the Tax Division. The
BOP had an established response timeframe of fifteen days, but averaged 105 days. The United
States Attorney’s Offices had a time frame of thirty days, but averaged 153. The established
timeframe for the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division and Criminal Division was thirty days. But they
averaged 263 days and 489 days respectively. Meanwhile, petitions were “at the White House,” on
average, for 9.4 months, before a decision was made. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF THE INSPEC-
TOR GEN. AUDIT DIV., AUDIT REP. 11-45, AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PROCESSING OF
CLEMENCY PETITIONS (2011), at xii–xiii, xvi.
149. P.S. Ruckman Jr., A 14-year Pardon Application Process?, PARDON POWER BLOG (Mar.
6, 2013), http://www.pardonpower.com/2013/03/a-14-year-pardon-application-process.html.
150. Perhaps there should even be an “administrative inefficiency” or—as is used in little
league baseball and adult league softball games around the nation, “skunk”—rule. Maybe any
application that is not properly addressed within five or ten years should be automatically granted?
151. See Office of the Pardon Attorney, supra note 2 (focusing on far right side of columns in
Department of Justice data).
152. In response to a personal e-mail dated May 10, 2013, U.S. Pardon Attorney Ronald Rod-
gers explained the aggregation of data in this category as follows:
You have asked whether we are able to ‘provide any insights on how one might go
about disaggregating the data for the category labeled ‘petitions denied or closed with-
out presidential action’ from 1945 to 1977, in order to bring it into line with data from
1978 forward.’ Unfortunately, we are unable to provide you with any information as to
how the data can be subdivided . . . denial and closure actions have been reported in
different formats at different times since 1900. Although statistics for clemency actions
from the McKinley Administration though the end of the Franklin Roosevelt Adminis-
tration differentiate between petitions denied and petitions closed without presidential
action, these categories were not further subdivided by the type of clemency involved—
i.e., pardon or commutation. After President Truman took office in 1945 and continuing
through the end of the Ford Administration in 1977, denials and closures without presi-
dential action were reported together as one category; midway through the Lyndon
Johnson Administration, these unsuccessful petitions were subdivided by the type of
clemency requested and were reported as pardon petitions denied or closed and commu-
tation petitions denied or closed . . . it was not until the Carter Administration that
statistics of unsuccessful clemency applications were further subdivided and reported
separately for both the form of clemency requested and the type of disposition. Your
second question asks if we could ‘elaborate as to why petitions would be closed without
presidential action.’ . . . Both pardon and commutation applications are closed without
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Along similar lines, it would also be useful if the proposed clemency
board were to have at least one academic, preferably a social scientist with
training and skill in data collection and both qualitative and quantitative
analysis. Again, every member of the board should always have a crystal
clear sense of what it is doing, how it is doing it, and—perhaps most impor-
tantly—why, in comparison to previous boards. The need for such data was
no more apparent than when many of Bill Clinton’s last-minute pardons did
not go through the “normal channels”:
These infamous “last-minute” pardons were, in part, notable be-
cause they generated unprecedented interest in information about
historical trends in the use of the pardoning power. . . . The New
York Times investigated patterns in clemency applications across
several years153 and reporters for the Los Angeles Times won-
dered if “other presidents [had] pardoned as many individuals
whose applications were not first reviewed by the Justice Depart-
ment.”154 The New York Daily News also wondered about the
number of times previous presidents had “bypassed traditional
channels” to grant pardons.155 USA Today was curious about the
Department of Justice’s role in the clemency process and what
limits there were to the president’s use of the pardoning power156
while reporters from the Washington Post and Christian Science
Monitor questioned whether “last-minute” pardons were “the
norm.”157 For the first time, calls for empirical analysis of the
presidential action if the petitioner withdraws the application or dies during the pen-
dency of its consideration. Moreover, a pardon application will be closed administra-
tively if the petitioner repeatedly fails to respond to a request by the Pardon Attorney for
information necessary for the processing of his application. Further, a commutation ap-
plication will be closed administratively if an applicant who seeks only reduction of his
prison sentence is released from prison before the President takes action on his re-
quest. Finally, since a person is not eligible to seek commutation of sentence if he is
challenging his conviction or sentence through litigation, a commutation application will
be closed administratively if it is learned that the clemency applicant is simultaneously
seeking relief from the courts.
E-mail from Ronald Rodgers, U.S. Pardon Attorney, to P.S. Ruckman (May 10, 2013).
153. Kurt Eichenwald & Michael Moss, Rising Numbers Sought Pardons in Last 2 Years,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/29/us/rising-numbers-sought-par-
dons-in-last-2-years.html?pagewanted=all.
154. See Jonathan Peterson & Lisa Getter, Clinton Pardons Raise Questions of Timing, Mo-
tive, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/jan/28/news/mn-18078; Richard
A. Serrano & Stephen Braun, 47 Pardons Skirted Review, Papers Show, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 8,
2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/feb/08/news/mn-22752.
155. Dave Saltonstall, Bill’s Very Bumpy Road from White House Pardons, Softgate Have
Pals Muttering ‘Tacky,’ ‘Sordid’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 11, 2001), http://www.nydailynews
.com/archives/news/bill-bumpy-road-white-house-pardons-sofagate-pals-muttering-tacky-sordid-
article-1.910966.
156. Judy Keen, Process Intended to Keep ‘Tranquility’, USA TODAY (Mar. 1, 2001), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/2001-03-01-pardonqa.htm.
157. Peter Grier, Clinton’s Suspect Pardons ‘Pardongate’ Sours Ex-President’s Legacy, His
Wife’s Image, and Public View of Politics, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 23, 2001), http://www
.csmonitor.com/2001/0223/p1s2.html; Michael Powell, Pardons With Precedent; Marc Rich
Drama is Latest in a Long Line of Last Acts, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2001, at C1.
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pardon power were coming from outside the discipline of political
science.158
In most instances, however, the search for data driven context came up
empty-handed. “Experts”—some from within the Department of Justice—
provided anecdotes and relied upon their recent memory. Some even
brought such reference points to congressional investigations. But no one
could even produce data on the number of pardons granted by previous
presidents that did not go through “normal channels.” It was all sad, unim-
pressive guesswork.159
If useful data are gathered, analyzed, and correctly understood,
Lieber’s hope that “a series of fair principles and rules” might be “settled by
practice,” and the pardon power could be protected from “arbitrary ac-
tion.”160 Under the current system, it is so easy to imagine nothing like this
is going on. Indeed, a former U.S. pardon attorney in the administrations of
George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton has said:
I can tell you that the system for reviewing cases and for getting
cases, and the kinds of considerations that we brought to bear in
the Department of Justice were really pretty random. . . . I can tell
you that the degree of secrecy and randomness and inefficiency
[in the present system] is extraordinary.161
E. Revamp the Annual Report of the Attorney General
Finally, the Annual Report of the Attorney General should return to the
level of transparency that existed in its pages from 1885 to 1932. In that
period, the name of each recipient of clemency was listed along with the
state where he or she was tried, the offense(s), the date of sentencing, the
sentence, the form of clemency, and, in many (if not most) instances, some
explanation as to why clemency was granted. Disagreements between the
president and the pardon attorney or attorney general were noted, as were
158. Ruckman, supra note 9, at 821.
159. In one instance, a former U.S. pardon attorney, speaking about Clinton’s late pardons
said, “this is the first time that I’m aware of that a huge number of pardons was done at the very
end of the term.” But that same individual was the U.S. pardon attorney in the previous adminis-
tration, that of George H.W. Bush, who—like most presidents before him—granted the largest
number of pardons in the fourth and final year of his term. Moreover, almost half of Bush’s
pardons and commutations of sentence were granted in the last month and half of his term—18
percent of his total falling in the last week. Transcript, Pardon Probe (PBS television broadcast,
Feb. 14, 2001), http://web.archive.org/web/20130723114720/http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/
law/jan-june01/pardon_2-14.html; P.S. Ruckman Jr., Professor of Pol. Sci., Rock Valley Coll.,
Address at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association: “Last-Minute” Par-
don Scandals: Fact and Fiction (Apr. 15–18, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=2214600, at 3–4, 10.
160. LIEBER, supra note 11, at 406.
161. Margaret Colgate Love, Former U.S. Pardon Attorney, Address at the University of St.
Thomas Law Journal Symposium: Reviewing Clemency in a Time of Change (Apr. 15, 2015).
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instances where applications did not go through “normal channels” and
were decided upon directly by the president.162
In addition to all of this information, the Annual Report should provide
the date when each application was filed, so that there can be better public
assessment of the process and those who are administering it. While it may
be impractical to provide all of the same information for applications that
are denied, some data should be provided which reveal the length of time
that it takes for those applications to be processed as well.
VII. EXPECTATIONS, GOALS, AND ASSESSMENT
There was a time when presidents granted more pardons than they de-
nied. Specific numerical quotas are probably inappropriate, but all of the
authors in this issue are in agreement that the pardon power was not placed
in the Constitution in order that presidents might neglect it. In Federalist
74, Alexander Hamilton noted that criminal codes have an almost natural
tendency toward over-severity. For that reason, he argued, there should be
“easy access” to mercy.163 By almost any standard or measure one might
employ, it is impossible to reasonably conclude that there has been “easy
access” to federal executive clemency in the United States, at least not in
the last five decades.
A. More Pardoning
One underlying goal of the changes proposed here is an increase in use
of the pardon power. Absent clear and convincing data that this or that
year’s applicants, as a group, are more serious offenders, less likely to have
experienced rehabilitation, or that punishment continues to serve some pub-
lic good, the number of clemency grants should at least moderately corre-
late with trends in federal convictions, time served by the prison population,
and completion of sentences. When federal convictions and the prison pop-
ulation boom (as they have since the 1980s), and pardons and commuta-
tions of sentence decline precipitously, the clemency board should not
conclude that it is the normal course of business. It should instead prepare
reports that explain with terrific precision why the disparities exist.
At present, presidents can complain that they are not getting applica-
tions they want to see.164 Deputy attorney generals can say they are recom-
162. Former U.S. Pardon Attorney Margaret Colgate Love argues Franklin Roosevelt’s 1933
“decision to stop publishing reasons for grants deprived the public of the factual predicate neces-
sary to hold pardon decision-makers accountable and reinforced the impression that pardoning
was mysterious, capricious, and possibly corrupt. It also encouraged both the president and the
Justice Department to think that they did not need to be accountable to the public for pardoning.”
Ruckman, supra note 149, at 9.
163. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
164. President Obama has explained his lack of pardoning on the fact that the Office of the
Pardon Attorney just isn’t sending him the kinds of applications that he wants. See P.S. Ruckman
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mending clemency, but presidents are not responding positively.165 U.S.
pardon attorneys can claim they are forwarding positive recommendations
but their suggestions are being ignored.166 This shell game should end.
If recommendations are being forwarded to the president, and the pres-
ident is simply not acting on them, everyone should know. If recommenda-
tions are not being forwarded, everyone should know that as well.
Aggregate data on the paths of clemency applications should be regularly
charted. If applications tend to get log-jammed in the Office of the Deputy
Attorney General, or at any single point in the bureaucratic trail, everyone
should know exactly where that point is. The tail should be explicitly
pinned on the donkey(s), again, regularly.167 Greater transparency is the
best possible path to consistency and, consequently, fairness.
B. More Regular Pardoning
Whatever the flow of applications and recommendations, the tendency
of pardons to be granted in the month of December, and more so in the
fourth and last year of each term (and certainly the final days and hours of
the term), should be consciously and valiantly resisted by all of the actors
involved. For most of our nation’s history, presidents granted pardons regu-
larly throughout the term. A full month would not pass without a single
pardon or commutation of sentence. Pardons were not so much newsworthy
events as they were regular, expected occurrences—the residue of a general
sense that presidents, as a matter of constitutional duty, were supposed to
participate in our system of checks and balances. This all ended in the ad-
ministration of Dwight Eisenhower.168
December pardoning—probably a by-product of Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion—sends all of the wrong signals, yet 51 percent of 2,973 individual
Jr., Obama: Even More Applications May Mean More Mercy, PARDON POWER BLOG (Mar. 21,
2015), http://www.pardonpower.com/2015/03/obama-more-applications-may-mean-more.html. It
was also reported that, under George W. Bush, “the White House repeatedly sought more
favorable recommendations.” Morison, supra note 138.
165. When testifying before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee in the aftermath of President
Clinton’s controversial last minute pardons, former Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder noted,
quite defensively, “There have been times when we have made, I have made recommendations to
the President in favor of a pardon request that was not granted.” President Clinton’s Eleventh
Hour Pardons: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, Serial No. J-107-3, 107th Cong. 1
(2001) (statement of Eric Holder Jr., Former Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice).
166. Former U.S. Pardon Attorney Margaret Colgate Love has felt the need to emphasize that
there were “times” when she “made recommendations to the President in favor of a pardon request
that was not granted.” P.S. Ruckman Jr., More on the O.P.A., PARDON POWER BLOG (Sept. 4,
2015), http://www.pardonpower.com/2015/09/more-on-opa.html.
167. See supra note 150.
168. P.S. Ruckman Jr., The Problem, in a Nutshell, PARDON POWER BLOG (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://www.pardonpower.com/2015/08/the-problem-in-nutshell.html#more.
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grants of clemency over the last thirty-nine years have been in that
month.169 As I have noted elsewhere:
Whatever merit there may be to the notion that the Scriptural nar-
rative of the Crucifixion of Christ [it] certainly serves as a very
poor building block for public understanding of federal executive
clemency [and as a] model for clemency policy making, it is even
more problematic. Indeed, the clear sense of the Crucifixion story
is that the prisoner, Barabbas, was guilty and on his way to execu-
tion. But, because of “tradition,” the arbitrary decision making of
Pilate and the passions of a mob, Barabbas was the recipient of an
extraordinary act of grace. The incident thus provides no consid-
eration whatsoever for clemency as the result of a truly delibera-
tive process. Nor does it consider clemency as the expected—if
not well deserved—result of rehabilitation, or clemency following
the expiration of a sentence. Indeed, the case of Barabbas serves
as a remarkably poor baseline for the typical clemency applica-
tion floating around in the Department of Justice, which does not
involve the death penalty and, more often than not, features an
applicant who has completed his/her sentence, properly addressed
all associated fines and penalties and is simply seeking to have
his/her civil rights restored. In sum, the more intelligent approach
would be for the pardon power to be used more frequently and
more evenly across the months of the year.170
While it is true that most presidents have granted the largest number of
pardons in the fourth and last year of the term, the last-minute pardon bo-
nanza of Bill Clinton was more unusual than anything else.171 Still, last-
minute pardoning invites the criticism that presidents are behaving in a
manner to escape political accountability for their decision-making. In addi-
tion to calling the pardon power in question, deserving recipients are cast in
a bad light as well.
C. Exercise of Group Pardons
Finally, in an era of mass incarceration, it is reasonable to hope for a
day when pardons are granted more frequently and conspicuously as the
product of explicit, methodical calculation toward the ends of justice and
the public good. The economy has languished for some time now. Budgets
are tight. Costly prisons cannot always be the go-to answer. Nor should
they be, if there is a sense that alternative forms of punishment are more
appropriate or more conducive to successful reincorporation into society.
There is a place for pardoning chicken stealing, coin mutilation, illegal
sale of bald eagle feathers, lumber theft from government property, or em-
169. P.S. Ruckman Jr., Seasonal Clemency Revisited: An Empirical Analysis, 11 WHITE
HOUSE STUDIES 21, 27 (2011).
170. Id. at 33–34.
171. Ruckman, supra note 159, at 2.
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bezzlement from national banks. But in an era of mass incarceration with
over four thousand offenses in the U.S. criminal code and increasing con-
cerns about overcriminalization,172 it seems appropriate that a newly cre-
ated clemency board can constantly remind itself that the clemency power
can be appropriately exercised for classes of persons. Amnesties (or group
pardons) are a great American tradition dating back to George Washing-
ton,173 and a clemency board should always explore the possibility and ap-
propriateness of such grants, in addition to individual grants.
This approach to clemency is quite common worldwide. In January of
2010, for example, the president of Manila granted eighteen commutations
of sentence, giving special consideration to “health conditions and the age
of the convicts.”174 One year earlier, over 500 prisoners were freed in
Ghana when clemency was granted to categories of recipients including the
following: nursing mothers guilty of non-bailable offenses, first-time of-
fenders who had served more than half of their term, all first-time offenders
above the age of seventy years, and all seriously ill prisoners not sentenced
to death or life imprisonment. Exempt from the amnesty were offenders in
those categories who were jailed for murder, armed robbery, rape, defile-
ment, narcotics, threat of death, carrying offensive weapons, manslaughter,
and escaping from lawful custody.175
In January of 2015, 584 prisoners were released by decree in Egypt
who had served at least fifteen years of life sentences or had served at least
half of their six-month sentences. The decree excluded those convicted of
crimes that harmed the government or crimes involving explosives, weap-
ons and ammunition, drugs, illegal profiteering, bribes, and forgery.176 In
March, 2015, the president of Tunisia commuted almost 1,000 prison
sentences on the basis of “objective criteria” focusing on “the gravity of the
crime or the offence, length of sentence served and the penalty remaining to
be executed. Other criteria such as first-time or repeat offender status and
172. “Overcriminalization describes the trend to use the criminal law rather than the civil law
to solve every problem, to punish every mistake, and to compel compliance with regulatory objec-
tives. Criminal law should be used only if a person intentionally flouts the law or engages in
conduct that is morally blameworthy or dangerous.” Overcriminalization, THE HERITAGE FOUNDA-
TION, http://www.heritage.org/issues/legal/overcriminalization (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).
173. P.S. Ruckman Jr., Daniel Horowitz: Don’t Know Much About History . . ., PARDON
POWER BLOG (July 18, 2015), http://www.pardonpower.com/2015/07/daniel-horowitz-dont-know-
much-about.html.
174. P.S. Ruckman Jr., Manila: 21 Pardons, PARDON POWER BLOG (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www
.pardonpower.com/2010/01/manila-21-pardons.html.
175. P.S. Ruckman Jr., Ghana: 500 Pardons. Amnesty!, PARDON POWER BLOG (Jan. 7, 2009),
http://www.pardonpower.com/2009/01/ghana-500-pardons-amnesty.html.
176. Egypt to Pardon 584 Prisoners on Jan 25, CAIROSCENE (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www
.cairoscene.com/BusinessAndPolitics/Egypt-to-Pardon-584-prisoners-jan25.
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good conduct [were] determining.” Detainees convicted of “serious crimes”
(terrorist crimes, weapon trafficking, and smuggling) were excluded.177
In April 2013, “as many as 7,000” persons were released from prisons
in Syria. The amnesty reduced death penalty sentences to life imprisonment
and also covered “prisoners with incurable diseases and elders over 70.”
Also excluded were “political prisoners or those convicted of drug and
weapon trafficking.”178
The point is not so much to advocate for any of these particular exam-
ples of amnesty as appropriate in the United States. But there is a place for
more regular, serious consideration of the delineation of particular classes
of persons for federal executive clemency, based on explicitly stated policy
goals, considerations of justice and the public good.
Currently, there are thousands of individuals in our federal prisons
who were convicted of drug offenses and received harsh sentences under
sentencing guidelines since rejected by both parties in both chambers of
Congress. On August 2, 2010, Congress addressed disparities in crack and
powder cocaine sentencing with passage of the Fair Sentencing Act
(FSA).179 It reduced federal mandatory minimums and maximums for
crack-related offenses to an 18:1 ratio (from a ratio of 100:1). Right away,
there were concerns about whether or not the FSA should be applied retro-
actively. Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) issued a state-
ment, which read, in part:
Retroactive application of the crack law by Congress and the
United States Sentencing Commission could affect an estimated
21,000 prisoners over the next 30 years, reducing sentences by an
average of almost four years. Enactment would result in substan-
tial savings in prison costs—currently shouldered by
overburdened American taxpayers—at no peril to public
safety. Each prisoner requesting a sentence reduction would be
considered individually, allowing courts to ensure that dangerous
offenders are not returned to society early. . . . Congress must
make the crack law retroactive. It’s a matter of simple fairness . . .
[they] must provide relief to those already in prison serving stiff
sentences for crack violations. It’s only right that Congress show
them the same compassion, fairness, and justice that the new law
provides to those entering the prison system.180
177. Tunisia: President of Republic Pardons 1,351 Inmates on Independence Day, ALLAFRICA
(Mar. 20, 2015), http://allafrica.com/stories/201503210123.html.
178. Syrian Presidential Pardon to Release Some 7,000 Prisoners, ENGLISH.NEWS.CN (Apr.
16, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-04/16/c_132314334.htm.
179. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).
180. FAMM Hails Introduction of Retroactive Crack Bill, FAMM (Dec. 17, 2010), http://web
.archive.org/web/20130123053708/http://www.famm.org/NewsandInformation/PressReleases/
FAMMHailsIntroductionofRetroactiveCrackBill.aspx.
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Courts also had to deal with more technical questions, such as whether
or not appellants should be subject to the new guidelines if they were sen-
tenced after the passage of the FSA, or whether the relevant point in time
was when crimes were thought to have been committed.181 Meanwhile re-
cord numbers of applications for commutations of sentence flew into the
Office of the Pardon Attorney.182
On April 23, 2014, former Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole
announced that the Department of Justice would “prioritize” commutation
applications from inmates serving federal sentences who likely would have
received a substantially lower sentence if convicted of the same offense(s)
today; who were nonviolent, low-level offenders without significant ties to
large-scale criminal organizations, gangs, or cartels; had served at least ten
years of their prison sentence; did not have a significant criminal history;
had demonstrated good conduct in prison; and had no history of violence
prior to or during their current term of imprisonment.183
To date, Mr. Cole’s program has yielded few positive results, but Pres-
ident Obama’s administration is not yet over. A newly created clemency
board should, again, constantly be mindful of the possibility of granting
clemency to classes of persons. If we are going to incarcerate at high rates,
we should be ever more mindful of ways to decrease the prison population
in accordance with the ends of justice and the public good.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In 1919, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer’s Annual Report argued
that his duties and responsibilities had “increased so greatly” that it became
“practically impossible” to give clemency applications “the attention and
thought” that they required.184 Palmer thus proposed the creation of a three-
member Pardon and Parole Board that would make recommendations to the
president.185 Three years later, the American Civil Liberties Union sent a
letter to President Harding calling for the creation of a “new agency” to
process clemency applications. According to the Washington Post, the or-
ganization thought the Department of Justice was “unable” to “go into”
cases in a proper manner because of its “organization,” its “other many
duties,” and the dominant role of federal attorneys who conducted the pros-
181. P.S. Ruckman Jr., Retroactivity: Easterbrook V. Posner, PARDON POWER BLOG (Aug. 29,
2011), http://www.pardonpower.com/2011/08/retroactivity-easterbrook-v-posner.html.
182. P.S. Ruckman Jr., More on Obama, Records and Clemency Applications, PARDON POWER
BLOG (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.pardonpower.com/2013/08/more-on-obama-records-and-clem-
ency.html.
183. New Clemency Initiative, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/par-
don/new-clemency-initiative.
184. Annual Report of the Attorney General, Dec. 8, 1919, 4.
185. Id.
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ecution.186 It is so unfortunate that reform-minded persons did not win the
day on these fronts a long, long time ago.
Many have high hopes that President Obama will exercise the pardon
power more generously before his term finally ends. It is quite unfortunate
that he has not exhibited more interest to date. But here we are. Unfortu-
nately, if he grants record numbers of pardons and commutations of sen-
tence between now and the end of the term, it may cause as much harm as
good so far as public perceptions of the pardon power are concerned. The
recommendations outlined above would, if implemented, prevent future
presidents from ever finding themselves in such a predicament.
186. Seeks New Pardon Agency, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1922, p. 6.
